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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DuE PROCEss-LIBERTY INTEREST 
IN FOSTER FAMILIES REQUIRES CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION 
IN CHILD REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS-Smith v. Organization of Fos­
ter Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816 (1977). 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Theoretically, the purpose of foster care is to provide a tem­
porary family environment for children who have been either vol­
untarilyl or involuntarily2 separated from their own families. 3 The 
courts have traditionally viewed the biological parent-child relation­
ship as the paramount interest in child placement decisions. This. 
approach has made them reluctant to recognize any rights in the 
foster parents which might interfere with the reunion of the child 
and his natural family. 4 
Although not by design, foster care now consists mostly of long 
term placements,5 which often lead to the development of strong 
1. See In the Child's Best Interests: Rights of the Natural Parents in Child 
Placement Proceedings, 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 446, 456 (1976) [hereinafter cited as In the 
Child's Best Interests]. Voluntary foster care occurs when the parents are unable or 
unwilling to give their children proper care due to phYSical, emotional, or economical 
conditions and offer to temporarily tum over custody of the child to an authorized 
agency of the state. Each state authorizes a variety of agencies to determine the 
placement of foster children. For purposes of this article, a general reference to "the 
state" will be used in place of the full name of the particular agency involved. 
2. Child "neglect" proceedings are instituted by the state for the protection of 
the child who has not received adequate care from his or her natural parents. Statutes 
calling for court intervention on behalf of the children do so for a variety of reasons 
including "abandonment, physical abuse, inadequate parenting, sexual abuse, failure 
to provide medical care and immoral or unconventional conduct." Wald, State Inter­
vention on Behalf of "Neglected" Children: Standard for Removal of Children 
From Their Homes, Monitoring the Status of Children in Foster Care and Tennina­
tion of Parental Rights, 28 STAN. L. REv. 623, 629 (1976) (footnote omitted). 
3. Foster care is theoretically a temporary arrangement providing benefits of a 
family environment to the child rather than placement in an institution. Katz, Legal 
Aspects of Foster Care, 5 FAM. L.Q. 283, 285 (1971). 
4. In the Child's Best Interests, supra note 1, at 448. Scarpetta v. Spence­
Chapin Adoption Service, 28 N.Y.2d 185, 321 N.Y.S.2d 65, 269 N.E.2d 787 (1971); 
People ex rei. Kropp v. Shepsky, 305 N.Y. 465, 469, 113 N.E.2d 801, 804 (1953). At 
least one court has held that too much love between the foster parent and child is 
detrimental to the child's welfare because it interferes with the child's relationship 
with his natural parents. In re Jewish Child Care Ass'n, 5 N.Y.2d 222, 183 N.Y.S.2d 
65, 156 N.E.2d 700 (1959). See also State ex reI. Wallace v. Lhotan, 51 App. Div. 2d 
252,380 N.Y.S.2d 250, appeal dismissed, 384 N.Y.S.2d 1030 (1976). 
5. Katz, supra note 3, at 301. See Organization of Foster Families for Equality 
239 
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emotional ties between the foster parent and the foster child. As a 
result, many courts now recognize that when close relationships 
have developed, the uprooting of the child from his foster home 
may have harmful effects on the child's well-being. 6 This recogni­
tion is based on the notion that it is important to the child's de­
velopment to become attached to a psychological parent7 and that 
under certain circumstances it may be best for the child if the fos­
ter parent fills that role. Consequently, an increasing number of 
courts now give a great deal of weight to the length of time a child 
has spent with a single foster family as they consider which type of 
placement will be in the best interests of the child. 8 
In addition to having become an important element in place­
ment decisions, the strength of the foster relationship and its effect 
on the foster child have given rise to the recognition that certain 
constitutional safeguards must be available to protect the foster 
family from an arbitrary and damaging separation. This note will 
analyze the rights that have been created in the foster family, 
& Reform v. Dumpson, 418 F. Supp. 277, 279 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) [hereinafter cited 
as OFFER v. Dumpsonl. In San Diego County, "[nlot only were almost half the chil­
dren in placement for 5 years or more, but for a great majority of the children the 
long-term plan consisted of continued foster care or no plan whatsoever." Comment, 
The Foster Parents Dilemma "Who Can I Tum to When Somebody Needs Me?," 11 
SAN DIEGO L. REv. 376, 390 (1974) [hereinafter cited as The Foster Parents Dilem­
mal. Some reasons for the trend toward long-term placement include: 
1) failure to rehabilitate natural parents to the point of caring for their own 
children; 2) inability to terminate parental rights preliminary to adoption; 3) 
lack of potential adoptive parents for black, Spanish-American, Indian and 
other minority group children, and the increasing number of these children 
adjuged un-cared for and therefore made wards of the state; 4) lack of po­
tential adoptive parents for older or mentally retarded or physically disabled 
children, and the increasing number of these children abandoned to the care 
of the state; 5) overburdened caseloads of governmental child welfare agen­
cies, causing a corresponding decrease in the resources and time available to 
find a qualified adoptive home for a foster child. 
Pearlman, Foster Parents' Rights in Connecticut, 5 CONN. L. REv. 36, 37-38 (1972) 
(footnote omitted). 
6. See generally OFFER v. Dumpson, 418 F. Supp. 277, 283 (S.D. N.Y. 1976); In 
re Kim Marie J., 398 N.Y.S.2d 374 (App. Div. 1977); In re J., 57 App. Div. 2d 568, 
393 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1977); The Foster Parents Dilemma, supra note 5, at 379-80. 
7. See, e.g., J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD, & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST IN­
. TERESTS OF THE CHILD 18 (1973) [hereinafter cited as GOLDSTEINl. 
8. "The best interests rule implicitly recognizes that each child is unique and 
that, ideally, the court should give primary regard to the child's individual needs." 
In the Child's Best Interests, supra note 1, at 449. Where extraordinary cir­
cumstances are present the best interests of the child may be considered always 
superior to parental custody. See Bennett v. Jeffreys, 40 N.Y.2d 543, 387 N.Y.S.2d 
821,356 N.E.2d 277 (1976). 
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focusing upon the procedural safeguards to which the foster family 
may be entitled in a proceeding for the removal of the foster child 
in light of the recent Supreme Court decision, Smith v. Organiza­
tion of Foster Families for Equality & Reform. 9 
II. SMITH V. OFFER 
Three individual foster families10 and the Organization of 
Foster Families for Equality and Reform brought a class action 
for injunctive and declaratory relief against state and local govern­
ment officials and the executive director of the Catholic Guardian 
Society who together were responsible for administering the fos­
ter care system. The action challenged New York Social Services 
Law § 383(2)11 which specifically authorizes discretionary agency 
removal of the child from her foster home; section 40012 which 
provides the aggrieved foster parents with a post-removal "fair hear­
ing"; and New York Code Rules and Regulations § 450.14,13 which 
9. 431 U.S. 816 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Smith v. OFFER], rev'g OFFER v. 
Dumpson, 418 F. Supp. 277 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). 
10. The situations of the three families involved here are typical of the prob­
lems brought on by the long-term trend of foster care. In all three cases the children 
had lived with their respective foster families for a long time and deep emotional 
attachments had developed despite the ever-present threat of agency removal. 
OFFER v. Dumpson, 418 F. Supp. 277, 279-80 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). 
11. N.Y. Soc. SERVo LAW § 383(2) (McKinney 1976) provides: 
The custody of a child placed out or boarded out and not legally 
adopted or for whom legal guardianship has not been granted shall be 
vested during his minority, or until discharged by such authorized agency 
from its care and supervision, in the authorized agency placing.out or board­
ing out such child and any such authorized agency may in its discretion 
remove such child from the home where placed or boarded. 
12. N.Y. Soc. SERVo LAw § 400 (McKinney 1976) provides: 
1. When any child shall have been placed in an institution or in a fam­
ily home by a commissioner of public welfare or a city public welfare officer 
the commissioner or public welfare officer may remove such child from such 
institution or family home and make such disposition of such child as is 
provided by law. 
2. Any person aggrieved by such decision of the commissioner of public 
welfare or city welfare officer may appeal to the department, which upon 
receipt of the appeal shall review the case, shall give the person making the 
appeal an opportunity for fair hearing thereon and within thirty days render 
its decision. The department may also, on its own motions, review any such 
decision made by the public welfare official. The department may make 
such additional investigation as it may deem necessary. All decisions of the 
department shall be binding upon the public welfare district involved and 
shall be complied with by the public welfare officials thereof. 
13. 18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 450.14 (1976) has been renumbered § 450.10 and now pro­
vides: 

Removal from foster family care. 
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provides for a pre-removal conference with a social services offi­
cial. 14 The plaintiffs claimed that the statutes violated both the 
equal protection15 and due process clauses of the fourteenth amend­
ment because they authorize removal of foster children from their 
foster homes without a prior hearing for either the foster parent or 
the foster child. These procedures, the plaintiffs contended, de­
prived them of a specific liberty interest without due process: the 
(a) Whenever a social services official of another authorized agency act­
ing on his behalf proposes to remove a child in foster family care from the 
foster family home, he or such other authorized agency, as may be approp­
riate, shall notify the foster family parents, in writing of the intention to 
remove such child at least 10 days prior to the proposed effective date of 
such removal, except where the health or safety of the child requires that he 
be removed immediately from the foster family home. Such notification shall 
further advise the foster family parents that they may request a conference 
with the social services official or a designated employee of his social ser­
vices department at which time they may appear, with or without a rep­
resentative to have the proposed action reviewed, be advised of the reasons 
therefore and be afforded an opportunity to submit reasons why the child 
should not be removed. Each social services official shall instruct and re­
quire any authorized agency acting on his behalf to furnish notice in accor­
dance with the provisions of this section. Fqster parents who do not object 
to the removal of the child from their home may waive in writing their right 
to the IO-day notice, provided, however, that such waiver shall not be exe­
cuted prior to the social services official's determination to remove th'e child 
from the foster home and notifying the foster parents thereof. 
(b) Upon the receipt of a request for such conference, the social services 
official shall set a time and place for such conference to be held within 10 
days of receipt of such request and shall send written notice of such confer­
ence to the foster family parents and their representative, if any, and to the 
authorized agency, if any, at least five days prior to the date of such confer­
ence. 
(c) The social services official shall render and issue his decision as ex­
peditiously as possible but not later than five days after the conference and 
shall send a written notice of his decision to the foster family parents and 
their representative, if any, and to the authorized agency, if any. Such deci­
sion shall advise the foster family parents of their right to appeal to the 
department and request a fair hearing in accordance with section 400 of the 
Social Services Law. 
(d) In the event there is a request for a conference, the child shall not 
be removed from the foster family home until at least three days after the 
notice of decision is sent, or prior to the proposed effective date of removal, 
whichever occurs later. 
(e) In any agreement for foster care between a social services official or 
another authorized agency acting on his behalf and foster parents, there shall 
be contained therein a statement of a foster parent's rights provided under 
this section. 
14. The sufficiency of these provisions under the due process clause of the 
fourteenth amendment will be discussed in section IV infra. 
15. The equal protection argument was not considered by the district court in 
its decision, and will not be discussed in this note. 
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right of family privacy which encompasses the right of the foster 
family to remain free from arbitrary state interference. 1s They 
argued that "the foster home is entitled to the same constitutional 
deference as that long granted to the more traditional biological 
£. il "17lam y. 
Although the district court found debate of this concept in­
teresting and important, it declined to decide the case on such a 
broad basis. 18 Instead, the court found that a right in the nature of 
a liberty interest existed in the foster child, who is entitled "to be 
heard before being 'condemned to suffer grievous loss.' "19 The 
court reasoned that in this type of case "the harmful consequences 
of a precipitous and perhaps improvident decision to remove a 
child from his foster family are apparent. "20 On this basis, the dis­
trict court held, in a 2-1 decision, that the New York statutes were 
constitutionally defective. The court stated that before a child can 
be removed from the foster home in which he has been living, he 
must be provided with a hearing in which all interested parties 
may present any relevant information before an administrative offi­
cial who has the power to determine the child's future place­
ment. 21 The court indicated, however, that a full trial-type hearing 
i.s not a constitutional requisite. 22 
16. 418 F. Supp. at 279. 
17. ld. at 281 (footnote omitted). The plaintiffs based their contentions on the 
concept of the foster family as a psychological entity, and on several decisions of the 
Supreme Court which they believed represented a "willingness to look behind legal 
formalities when inquiring into the existence of a fruitful family life." ld. (footnote 
omitted). These contentions will be discussed in greater depth in section III infra. 
18. ld. at 282. 
19. ld. (citing Joint Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 
(1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)). The court reached this conclusion by determin­
ing children to be "persons" within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment 
whose rights are entitled to protection from state abridgment. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 
U.S. 565 (1975); Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969); In re 
Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
20. 418 F. Supp. at 283. 
21. ld. at 282. Judge Pollack, dissenting, contended that although it may be 
wise to afford the foster child the right to be heard, it has not been established that 
increased procedural protection is necessary to "impede judgments reasonably 
reached by concerned independent disinterested agencies and professionals by less 
starchy methods." ld. at 291. 
22. The opinion called for certain minimum procedural protections for any 
child who has been in a foster home for one year or more. These procedures demand 
an automatic pre-removal agency hearing at which the child or an adult representa­
tive of the child may participate. The court also indicated that the hearing should be 
before an uninvolved officer who has no prior knowledge of the case. The court also 
required the participation of all interested parties, including the foster parents, the 
natural parents, and the lI:gency in addition to the introduction of any relevant evi­
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On direct appeal, the Supreme Court rejected the district 
court's holding, finding that a liberty interest requiring stringent 
due process safeguards did not exist in the foster child. 23 However, 
the majority did recognize the existence of a liberty interest in the 
foster family; the right to family privacy.24 In the Supreme Court's 
view, "biological relationships are not the exclusive determination 
of the existence of the family . . ." and "the importance of the fa­
milial relationship, to the individuals involved and to the society, 
stems from ... the intimacy of daily association, and from the role 
it plays in 'promot[ing] a way of life' through the instruction of chil­
dren, as well as from the fact of blood relationship. "25 The Court 
realized that the increased length of foster care often leads to the 
development of deep family attachments in the foster home that 
should be afforded protection from unjustified state interference. 
The extension of a liberty interest to the foster family implicitly ac­
cepts the conclusion of studies that emphasize the need to protect 
dence which might have a bearing on the outcome of the case. Id. at 286. Unless 
otherwise noted, any discussion of the rights of the foster children, foster parents, or 
foster family to a hearing or to the constitutional safeguards necessary to protect their 
interests, will be made in reference to the above procedures. 
23. Smith v. OFFER, 431 U.S. 816, 840-41 (1977). The Court determined that 
finding a liberty interest in the foster child does not activate due process protections 
without a further showing that the liberty interest is of such dimension as to require 
these protections. 
24. The Supreme Court has increasingly recognized that the biological family 
has certain inherent rights which cannot be arbitrarily invaded by state action. The 
plaintiff's claim of a right to foster family privacy in the instant case was based on 
this notion. 418 F. Supp. at 279, 281. In Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923), 
the Court recognized that a person's liberty interest includes the right to establish a 
home and bring up children. Subsequently, the Court struck down an Oregon stat­
ute, finding that it unreasonably interfered with the rights of parents and guardians 
to direct the upbringing of the children under their control. Pierce v. Society of 
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925). The express inclusion of guardians in the class of 
persons protected in that case suggests that the Court might be willing to go beyond 
the biological parents in finding a liberty interest. The Court has found that there is 
a private realm of family life which the state cannot enter. Prince v. Massachusetts, 
321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); see also Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 
632, 639 (1974). This private realm specifically includes the care, custody, manage­
ment, and companionship of one's children. May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533 
(1953). In Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645,653 (1972), the Court recognized a liberty 
interest in the father of an illegitimate child who demanded due process protections to 
prevent his child from automatically becoming a ward of the state. These cases in­
dicate the extent of the Court's recognition of the fundamental importance of the 
family relationship and the rights of the parents to control the development of their 
children. To protect these rights the Court has acknowledged the existence of a 
liberty interest in the biological family which requires commensurate due process 
protections. 
25. 431 U.S. at 843-44 (citations omitted). 
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positive psychological relationships created by child placements in 
foster care. 26 Those psychoanalytic studies have established "the 
need of every child for unbroken continuity of affectionate and stim­
ulating relationships with an adult. "27 
Although the Supreme Court recognized the existence of a 
liberty interest in the foster family, the majority reasoned that the 
foster parent's contract with the state, which grants the agency dis­
cretion to terminate the foster care relationship, limits that inter­
est. 28 The Court also found that when the child is removed from 
the foster home and returned to the natural parents, the liberty 
interest in the foster family must be severely curtailed by the com­
peting and dominant interest of the natural parents. 29 The Court 
concluded that the magnitude of the appellee's "liberty interest" 
was insufficient to support the holding of the district court because 
the New York removal procedures were more than adequate to 
protect any such interest. 30 
The Supreme Court's reasons for limiting the magnitude of the 
liberty interest were not entirely persuasive. Although provisions in 
the placement agreements grant the agency the discretion to termi­
nate the foster care arrangements, courts are increasingly willing 
to limit the scope of agency discretion when the welfare of the 
child would suffer as a result of a removal decision. 31 In addition, 
the Supreme Court's observation that the interest of the natural 
parents is predominant does not bear directly on the problem, 
since most removals are made to place the child in another foster 
home. 32 As the district court pointed out, granting the foster family 
increased protection by providing a full hearing is not "intended in 
any way to impede the right of biological parents to regain custody 
of their children. "33 The district court went on to explain that by 
26. See, e.g., GOLDSTEIN, supra note 7. This study has emerged as one of the 
leading authorities in the area of child placement and is frequently cited in recent 
judicial decisions. 
27. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 7, at 6. 
28. 431 U.S. at 845-46. 
29. [d. 
30. [d. The basis for the holding of the Supreme Court is discussed in greater 
depth infra notes 84-99 and accompanying text. 
31. When the parental rights doctrine was dominant, the contractual rights were 
strongly upheld; however, as the rights of foster parents have increased, the impor­
tance of such contracts has diminished. Bodenheimer, New Trends and Require­
ments in Adoption Law and Proposals for Legislative Change, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 10, 
35-41 (1975). 
32. 431 U.S. at 829 n.23. 
33. 418 F. Supp. at 283. One court has suggested that the courts must treat any 
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providing for such constitutional safeguards, the agency has the 
benefit of an "organized forum" within which information may be 
more efficiently and effectively gathered, thereby promoting a de­
cision that will serve the interests of the child. 34 The willingness of 
the Supreme Court to recognize the existence of a liberty interest 
in the foster family may in the long run prove more Significant than 
the limitations it placed on that interest, since lower courts may 
not give such great weight to limiting circumstances in future 
cases. 
III. FINDING SPECIFIC LIBERTY INTERESTS 

WITHIN THE FOSTER FAMILY 

The Supreme Court's opinion recognized only the liberty 
interest in the foster family generally. It specifically rejected the 
district court's finding of a liberty interest in the foster child and 
did not directly discuss the rights of foster parents. Rights of the 
foster parents and foster children have, however, been specifically 
recognized in many jurisdictions. Recognition of these rights has 
allowed courts to afford the foster family important safeguards 
against an unjustified separation. 
A. Rights of the Foster Parents 
The recognition of rights in the foster parent has been increas­
ing in a number of states. One court has noted that: 
[tlhere is no sound reason to deny a 'person who has voluntarily 
assumed the obligations of parenthood over a child the same 
basic rights to due process a natural or legal parent possesses 
when the state intervenes to disrupt or destroy the family unit. 
"The policy of our law has always been to encourage family rela­
tionships, even those foster in character. "35 
One leading authority has proposed that it is the "psychological" 
and not the "biological" parent who represents the important rela­
tionship in a child's development. 36 This proposition has received 
action involving an agency removal of a foster child equally, whether the removal is 
made to place the child in another foster home or to return him to his biological 
parents. In re W., 77 Misc. 2d 374, 376, 355 N.Y.S.2d 245, 249 (Fam. Ct. N.Y. County 
1974). 
34. Id. See note 22 supra. 
35. James v. McLinden, 341 F. Supp. 1233, 1235 (D. Conn. 1969) (quoting 
Banks v. United States, 267 F.2d 535, 539 (2d Cir. 1959». 
36. Such a relationship is the product of emotional attachment resulting "from 
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increasing support from the courtS. 37 In California, for instance, 
where the state had traditionally been given broad discretion and 
the foster parents limited rights,38 the courts have begun to treat 
the foster parents as de facto custodians, entitling them to "appear 
as parties to assert and protect their own interest in the companion­
ship, care, custody and management of the child."39 It is now 
considered important to have the de facto parents present at the 
hearing to aid the court in reaching a proper decision, since "the 
views of such persons who have experienced close day-to-day con­
'tact with the child deserve consideration; moreover, an award of 
custody to such de facto parents is often among the alternate dis­
positions which the court must evaluate. "40 In Pennsylvania, foster 
parents have been granted the right to petition for custody of their 
foster children in order to prevent removal of the children from the 
foster home. 41 Foster parents have also been given the right to a 
pre-removal administrative hearing when agency removal of the 
foster children in their care is sought.42 In Connecticut, it has been 
held that the foster parents have no right to initiate a hearing prior 
to removal, under a statute that entitled certain parties to revoke 
day to day attention to his needs for physical care, nourishment, comfort, affection, 
and stimulation." GOLDSTEIN, supra note 7, at 17. It is now often recognized that "a 
de facto custodial interest develops in a foster parent when the foster relationship 
continues over a period of time." Katz, supra note 3, at 286. 
37. Drummond v. Fulton County Dep't of Family & Children's Services, 547 
F.2d 835, 853 (5th Cir. 1977). See Ross v. Hoffman, 33 Md. App. 333, 364 A.2d 596 
(1976), modified on other grounds, 372 A.2d 582 (1977); Cennami v. Dep't of Public 
Welfare, 77 Mass. Adv. Sh. 687, 363 N.E.2d 539 (1977). 
38. See The Foster Parents Dilemma, supra note 5, at 398-406. 
39. In re B.G., 11 Cal. App. 3d 679, 693, 523 P.2d 244, 254, 114 Cal. Rptr. 444, 
. 454 (1974) (footnote 	omitted). See also Katzoff v. Superior Court, 54 Cal. App. 3d 
1079, 127 Cal. Rptr. 178 (1976). 
40. Katzoff v. Superior Court, 54 Cal. App. 3d 1079, 1084, 127 Cal. Rptr. 178, 
180 (1976). 
41. Stapleton v. Dauphin County Child Care Services, 228 Pa. Super. 371, 324 
A.2d 562 (1974). For an analysis of this decision, see Note, Increasing the Rights of 
Foster Parents, 36 U. PITT. L. REV. 715 (1975). 
42. This regulation affords the foster parents an informal pre-removal hearing 
with the executive director of the agency, at which both the agency and the foster 
parents are permitted to question all testimony and evidence presented. PA. DEP'T 
OF PUBLIC WELFARE, CHILDREN AND YOUTH MANUAL, tit. 4300, §§ 4360-4363, 5 Pa. 
Bull. No. 34, 2032-34 (August 9, 1975). Under this provision, the foster parents also 
have the right to a pre-removal appeal in accordance with the Administrative Agency 
Law, at which they are entitled to counsel. Id. These administrative hearings provide 
for the introduction of all relevant evidence and reasonable examination and cross­
examination. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11305 (Purdon 1968); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, 
§ 1710.32 (Purdon 1962). 
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the commitment of minor children to the welfare commissioner. 43 
A strong dissent, however, would have allowed the foster parents 
to participate under the statute in question reasoning that recent 
decisions have "blurred the distinction between rights of natural 
parents and the rights of foster parents in this area. "44 Some courts 
will now balance equally the foster parents' right to custody of the 
child with the rights of the natural parents. 45 
Further evidence of the expansion of foster parents' rights can 
be found in their increasing ability to adopt children in their care. 
The difficulty of finding adoptive homes for certain children and 
the notion that many children eventually regard the foster family as 
their own have led some states to encourage foster parents to adopt 
their foster children in certain situations. 46 The recognition of rela­
tive equality of rights between the foster and natural parents has 
resulted in situations in which the foster parents have been held 
entitled to custody of the child even over a natural parent who was 
not first judged to be unfit. 47 
Despite the trend towards the recognition of some degree of 
43. Eason v. Welfare Comm'r, 171 Conn. 630, 370 A.2d 1082 (1976). 
44. Id. at 1087 (Longo, J., dissenting). See Borsdorf v. Mills, 49 Ala. App. 658, 
275 So. 2d 338 (1973). The court noted that "[tlhe bonds of love between parent 
and child are not dependent upon blood relation and instinct, but may be forged 
as strongly in the crucible of day to day living." Id. at 661-62, 275 So. 2d at 341. Pace v. 
Curtis, 496 S.W.2d 931 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973); In re One Minor Child, 254 A.2d 443 
(Del. 1969); Fleming v. Hursh, 271 Minn. 337, 136 N.W.2d 109 (1965). 
45. See, e.g., James v. McLinden, 341 F. Supp. 1233, 1235 (D. Conn. 1969). 
''To give paramount consideration to the principle of parental priority or ownership 
in custody decisions ~ould often be anathema to the best interest of the child." 
Borsdorf v. Mills, 49 Ala. App. 658, 662, 275 So. 2d 338, 341 (1973). See also Ross v. 
Hoffman, 33 Md. App. 333, 339, 364 A.2d 596, 600 (1976), modified on other 
grounds, 372 A.2d 582 (1977). The court found that the preference of the natural 
parent in custody decisions is merely a burden-placing device which puts the burden 
of persuasion on the non-biological parent. 
46. Bodenheimer, supra note 31, at 37-38. The author recommended that foster 
parents who have cared for a child for over eighteen months be given preference 
over other adoption applicants. Id. at 39. See N.Y. Soc. SERVo LAw § 383(3) (McKin­
ney 1976), which gives adoption preference to the foster parents when they have had 
custody of the child for two years or more. 
47. Ross V. Hoffman, 33 Md. App. 333, 341-42, 364 A.2d 596, 602 (1976), mod­
ified on other grounds, 372 A.2d 582 (1977). In this case, the long period of separa­
tion (nine years) outweighed the rights of the natural parents to custody. The court 
felt that the child was well cared for during this period and that the natural mother 
had substantially abandoned her role as physical parent and therefore ordered that 
custody of the child remain with the substitute parent despite the fact that the 
natural mother and her new husband appeared to be fit as parents. See In re Roy, 90 
Misc. 2d 35, 393 N.Y.S.2d 515 (Fam. Ct. N.Y. County 1977); In re S., 74 Misc. 2d 
935,347 N.Y.S.2d 274 (Fam. Ct. N.Y. County 1973). 
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liberty interest in the foster parents, the interest may be "deriva­
tive, enjoyed only 'by virtue of the child's best interests being con­
sidered.' "48 It is really the interest of the foster child that is at 
stake in custody decisions, and it is this interest that the courts 
usually seek to protect. 49 The rights said to exist in the foster par­
ents thus seem to serve mostly as a means by which the interest of 
the foster child can be protected. Whether the interest sought to 
be protected exists in the foster parent or child, it must be given 
adequate safeguards to protect the child's welfare. 
B. The Liberty Interest in the Child 
There have been few cases in which courts have specifically 
stated that a liberty interest exists in the foster child. As a result of 
the district court decision in the instant case, which found such an 
interest,50 other courts have also begun to recognize its exis­
tence. 51 One court concluded that, "both the foster parents having 
a close familial relationship during the first years of this child's life 
and the child himself have a protectable interest under the Four­
teenth Amendment which cannot be denied them without due 
process of law."52 However, the number of decisions taking such a 
positive view of the rights of the foster child has remained limited. 
Although the courts are reluctant to expressly find a liberty 
interest in the foster child which is of sufficient magnitude to be 
considered a fundamental right, they reach essentially the same re­
sult by applying the "best interests of the child" test as they at­
tempt to resolve child custody disputes. In 1925, the New York 
Court of Appeals recognized that the best interests of the child 
should be the primary consideration in child custody decisions. 53 
This test has grown to be the "guiding factor" in virtually all cus­
48. In re Louis F., 42 N.Y.2d 260, 264, 366 N.E.2d 824, 825, 397 N.Y.S.2d 735, 
736 (1977) (quoting Bennett v. Jeffreys, 40 N.Y.2d 543, 552 n.2, 356 N.E.2d 277, 285 
n.2, 387 N.Y.S.2d 821, 829 n.2 (1976))., 
49. New York courts, for example, have determined that it is the duty of the 
court to function as parens patriae and do what is best for the interests of the child. 
Kurtis v. Ballou, 33 App. Div. 2d 1034, 1034,308 N.Y.S.2d 770, 771 (1970). See 111 re 
5.,74 Misc. 2d 154,347 N.Y.S.2d 470 (1973). 
50. See notes 19-21 supra and accompanying text. 
51. OFFER v. Dumpson has been cited in several recent decisions for the 
proposition that there is a liberty interest in the child deserving of due process pro­
tections. See, e.g., cases cited in note 52 infra. 
52. Drummond v. Fulton County Dep't of Family & Children's Services, 547 
F.2d 835, 857 (5th Cir. 1977). See Eason v. Welfare Comm'r, 171 Conn. 630,370 A.2d 
1032 (1976) (Longo, J., dissenting). . 
53. Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y. 429, 434, 148 N.E. 624, 626 (1925). 
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tody disputes. 54 Its continued use in various fOnTIS suggests that 
the courts implicitly recognize certain rights in the child that may 
be in the nature of a liberty interest of constitutional magnitude. 55 
It has often been claimed, for example, that the child has a right to 
a stable environment,56 and that the best interests are not served 
by uprooting the child,57 even where the removal is only tempor­
ary.58 This gives rise to a legally protected right in the child to 
continue in the custody of his foster parents when he has remained 
in a foster home for a significant period of time and a strong substi­
tute relationship has developed. 59 One court has gone so far as to 
claim that a foster child may have a "Constitutional right to freedom 
from the ... [natural parent's] claim."60 
Some courts have recognized that the foster child has a right 
,to a pre-removal hearing to ensure that his best interests are being 
protected. One court noted that when the removal of infants from 
their foster parents is threatened, the right to a hearing to deter­
mine the best interests is for the benefit of the innocent child and 
cannot be forfeited by the foster parents. 61 It is clear that "[ w ]hether 
or not there exists a due process right in the foster parents which 
demands a review of agency decisions, the best interests of the 
child would be better served by having all interested parties heard 
on the matter."62 The American Civil Liberties Union has echoed 
54. Burghdoff v. Burghdoff, 66 Mich. App. 603, 611, 239 N.W.2d 679, 681 
(1976).. 
55. Bennett v. Jeffreys, 40 N.Y.2d 543, 546, 356 N.E.2d 277, 281, 387 N.Y.S.2d 
821, 825 (1976). 
56. In re J., 57 App. Div. 2d 568, 568, 393 N.Y.S.2d 449, 450 (1977). The court 
held that it was not in the best interests of the child to remove him from his foster 
home, when that was the only home he had ever known. 
57. In re Dionisio R., 81 Misc. 2d 436, 439, 366 N.Y.S.2d 280, 284 (Fam. Ct. 
N.Y. County 1975). See In re S., 74 Misc. 2d 154, 347 N.Y.S.2d 470 (Fam. Ct. Kings 
County 1973); Foster, Adoption and Child Custody: Best Interest of the Child?, 22 
BUFFALO L. REV. 1,12-13 (1973). See also Wald, supra note 2, at 645; The Foster Par­
ents Dilemma, supra note 5, at 379-80. 
58. Cennami v. Dep't of Public Welfare, 77 Mass. Adv. Sh. 687, 694-95, 363 
N.E.2d 539, 544 (1977). The court held that where an existing parental relationship 
had existed for almost the entire two year life of the child, the interests of the child 
demanded that a hearing be afforded. Id. at 699,363 N.E.2d at 545. 
59. Id. at 700, 363 N.E.2d at 546. See also Ex rei. Larue, 366 A.2d 1271, 1287 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1976) (Hoffman, J., dissenting); Commonwealth ex rei. Children's Aid 
Society v. Card, 362 Pa. 85, 97, 66 A.2d 300, 306 (1949). 
60. In re Roy, 90 Misc. 2d 35, 39, 393 N.Y.S.2d 515, 518 (Fam. Ct. N.Y. County 
1977). In this case an action was brought by the Social Services Agency under the 
permanent neglect statute to free the child so that the foster parents could adopt him. 
61. Kurtis v. Ballou, 33 App. Div. 2d 1034, 1034,308 N.Y.S.2d 770, 772 (1970). 
62. The Foster Parents Dilemma, supra note 5, at 406. 
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this view in arguing for the rights of the foster family to be free 
from arbitrary state termination. The ACLU claims that the foster 
parents and the foster child have a right to a hearing before they 
can be deprived of the "psychological parent"-child relationship 
that has been created. 63 In the opinion of one authority, "court[s] 
cannot do 'complete justice' unless the child is recognized as a 
necessary, indeed, indispensable party to the proceeding. "64 
In addition to the case law, there has also been statutory rec­
ognition of the need to protect the child's best interests. New York 
Social Services Law § 392,65 which is at issue in the instant case, 
63. [1976-77J 3 FAM. L. REp. (BNA) 2462. 
64. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 7, at 65. The district court recognized the necessity 
of having the interests of the child articulated at the hearing in order to have a 
proper determination. OFFER v. Dumpson, 418 F. Supp. 277, 285-86 (S.D.N.Y. 
1976). 
65. N.Y. Soc. SERvo LAW § 392 (McKinney Supp. 1976-77) provides in perti­
nent part: 
2. Where a child has remained in foster care for a continuous period of 
eighteen months a petition to review the foster care status of such child to­
gether with a copy, if any, of the placement instrument: 
(a) shall be filed in the family 'court by the authorized agency charged 
with the care and custody or the guardianship and custody of such child; 
(b) may be filed by another authorized agency having the supervision of 
such foster care; 
(c) may be filed by the foster parent or parents in whose home the child 
resides or has resided during such period of eighteen months: 
4. Notice of the hearing, including statement of the dispositional alterna­
tives of the court, shall be given and a copy of the petition shall be served 
upon the following, each of whom shall be a party entitled to participate in 
the proceeding: 
(a) the authorized agency charged with the care and custody or the 
guardianship and custody. of such child,' if such authorized agency is not the 
petitioner; 
(b) the authorized agency having supervision of such foster care, if such 
authorized agency is not the petitioner; 
(c) the foster parent or parents in whose home the child resided or re­
sides at or after the expiration of a continuous period of eighteen months in 
foster care; 
(d) the child's parent or guardian who transferred the care and custody 
of such child temporarily to an authorized agency; 
(e) a person to whom a parent entrusted the care of the child, where 
such person transferred the care of the child to an authorized agency; 
(f) such other persons as the court may, in its discretion, direct. 
6. The court may, in its discretion, dispense with the attendance of the child 
at the hearing or may, with the consent of the parties, dispense with the 
hearing and make a determination based upon papers and affidavits submit­
ted to the court. 
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represents a legislative attempt to protect the best interests of the 
child in foster care. It provides explicitly that any disposition must 
be made in the best interest of the child. 66 Other jurisdictions have 
also enacted statutes which recognize the need to protect the 
child's interests in custody determinations involving foster care. 67 
Michigan's statute sets out in detail the factors to be considered in 
determining the child's best interest in such situations. 68 Despite 
7. At the conclusion of such hearing, the court shall, upon the proof ad­
duced, in accordance with the best interest of the child, enter an order of 
disposition: 
(a) directing that foster care of the child be continued; 
An order of disposition entered pursuant to this subdivision shall in­
clude the court's findings supporting its determination that such order is in 
accordance with the best interest of the child. If the court promulgates sepa­
rate findings of fact or conclusions of law, or an opinion in lieu thereof, the 
order of disposition may incorporate such findings and conclusions, or opin­
ions, by reference. 
Analysis of the sufficiency of this procedure in the instant case may be found at 
notes 76-79, 95-99 infra and accompanying text. 
66. "[T]he 'best interests of the child' criteria [as provided for in section 392] is 
not merely a descriptive statutory phrase, but an expression of that which must be 
given overriding concern." In re L., 77 Misc. 2d 363, 367, 353 N.Y.S.2d 317, 324 
(Fam. Ct. N.Y. County 1974). 
67. See;e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.64(1) (West Supp. 1977-78). 
68. MICH. COMPo LAws ANN. § 722.23 (West Supp. 1977-78): 
722.23 Best interests of the child, definition 

Sec. 3 "Best interests of the child" means the sum total of the following fac­

tors to be considered, evaluated and determined by the court: 

(a) The love, affection and other emotional ties existing between the 
competing parties and the child. 
(b) The capacity and disposition of competing parties to give the child 
love, affection and guidance and continuation of the educating and raising of 
the child in its religion or creed, if any. 
(c) The capacity and disposition of competing parties to provide the 
child with food, clothing, medical care or other remedial care recognized 
and permitted under the laws of this state in lieu of medical care, and other 
material needs. 
(d) The length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory envi­
ronment and the desirability of maintaining continuity. 
(e) The permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or proposed custo­
dial home. 
(f) The moral fitness of the competing parties. 
(g) The mental and physical health of the competing parties. 
(h) The home, school and community record of the child. 
(i) The reasonable preference of the child, if the court deems the child 
to be of sufficient age to express preference. 
(j) Any other factor considered by the court to be relevant to a particular 
child custody dispute. 
See generally Doe v. Mitchell, 397 Mich. 225, 244 N.W.2d 827 (1976). 
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increasing recognition of the importance of adhering to the "best 
interests of the child" standard, the majority of states have not yet 
enacted laws which so thoroughly attempt to protect the interest of 
the child. However, statutory provisions which have been adopted 
make it clear that the interests of the child are of paramount im­
portance. They support the conclusion that there is a liberty in­
terest in the child which 'must be accorded due process safeguards. 
IV. SUFFICIENCY OF THE NEW YORK REMOVAL PROCEDURES 
In the instant case, the district court, in striking down the New 
York procedures, stressed the need for a pre-removal hearing. 69 
The court reasoned that "[aJ hearing dispels the appearance and 
minimizes the possibility of arbitrary or misinformed action. . . . 
This is especially true for children such as these who have already 
undergone the emotionally scarring experience of being removed 
from the home of their natural parents. "70 The pre-removal confer­
ence provided for by section 450.1471 was held to be inadequate as 
a data-gathering device because the foster parents are not permit­
ted to present evidence or witnesses, the public official involved is 
not necessarily a neutral observer of the situation, and the foster 
child is not permitted to participate. 72 The court viewed the post­
removal hearing provided for by Social Services Law § 40073 as 
inadequate. 74 It was "at the least, paradoxical to suggest that a hear­
ing designed to forestall the hasty and ill-advised separation of a 
foster child from his foster home can occur after that separation has 
already taken place. "75 
The court also found New York Social Services Law § 392, 
which provides for a pre-removal judicial hearing at the request of 
the foster parents,76 to be defective, in that: 1) The statute offers no 
69. See note 19 supra and accompanying text. 
70. OFFER v. Dumpson, 418 F. Supp. 277, 282-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (citation 
omitted). 
71. See note 13 supra. : 
72. 418 F. Supp. at 283. 
73. See note 12 supra. 
74. The Supreme Court has held that for a hearing to comply with due process, 
it must be held at a meaningful time, place, and manner and must occur before de­
privation of an interest, except in extraordinary circumstances. Boddie v. Connecticut, 
401 U.S. 371, 378-79 (1971). The Court has also noted that what is considered mean­
ingful depends on the nature of the case. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 542 (1971) 
(citing Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950)); 
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263 (1970). 
75. 418 F. Supp. at 284. 
76. See note 65 supra. 
I 
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benefits to a child who has been in foster care for less than eight­
een months;77 2) the family court does not have the power under 
the statute to order the child to remain in a specified foster 
home;7S and 3) there is no provision for invoking this section if 
removal is not brought to the attention of the court by the foster 
parents. In supporting this finding the court reasoned that the right 
to a hearing for the benefit of the child should not be made to 
"depend upon the initiative of third persons," because of the over­
riding importance of protecting the foster child. 79 
The district court also noted a recent New York City proce­
dure, so which at the request of the foster parents provides for "a 
pre-removal 'independent review' conducted 'in accordance with 
the concepts of due process.' "S1 The court found even this proce­
dure inadequate to afford foster children the full protection neces­
sary in that it is only available upon request of the foster parents, it 
does not apply in instances where the child is to be returned to his 
natural parents, and it does not allow the child and the biological 
parent to participate, all of which limits the effectiveness of the 
hearing. s2 
77. 418 F. Supp. at 284. The district court called for protection whenever a 
child is in foster care for one year or more. Id. at 282. 
78. Id. at 284. The court based this finding on the opinion in In re W., 77 Misc. 
2d 374, 376, 355 N.Y.S.2d 245, 248 (Fam. Ct. N.Y. County 1974) (where it was de­
termined that in a § 392 proceeding, the foster parents cannot receive a temporary 
disposition in their favor). But see Smith v. OFFER, 431 U.S. 816, 832 n.32 (1977) 
(the Supreme Court indicated that the family court did in fact order the child to re­
main in the same foster home). 
79. 418 F. Supp. at 285. 
80. Its salient features, as set forth in an internal memorandum of August 5, 
1974, are as follows: 
(1) the review is heard before a supervisory official who has had no previous 
involvement with the decision to remove the child; (2) both the foster par­
ents and the agency may be represented by counsel and each may present 
witnesses and evidence; (3) all witnesses must be sworn, unless stipulated 
otherwise, and all testimony is subject to cross-examination, (4) counsel for 
the foster parents must be allowed to examine any portion of the agency's 
files used to support the proposal to remove the child; (5) either a tape re­
cording or stenographic record of the hearing must be kept and made avail­
able to the parties at cost; and (6) a written decision, supported by reasons, 
must be rendered within five days and must include a reminder to the foster 
parents that they may still request a post-removal hearing under N.Y.C.R.R. 
Section 450.14. 
418 F. Supp. at 285. 
81. 418 F. Supp. at 285. This procedure offers a pre-removal hearing only in 
New York City; no such hearing is provided throughout the rest of the state. Id. at 
232 n.13. 
82. 418 F. Supp. at 285. 
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The district court concluded that the New York statutes, "as 
presently operated, unduly infringe the constitutional rights of fos­
ter children, "83 but did not specifically describe standards that 
would be constitutionally sufficient. However, the court did indi­
cate that minimum standards should require: 1) That an automatic 
hearing be held before the removal of any child who has been in 
foster care for more than one year; 2) that the hearing be before 
some neutral officer who has the authority to order continued 
placement of the child with their foster parents; 3) that all parties, 
including the agency, the natural parents, the foster parents, and 
the child or the representative appointed to protect his interest be 
represented; and 4) that all parties be permitted to introduce any 
relevant evidence. The court concluded that the present New York 
procedures did not satisfY these minimum requirements and were 
therefore insufficient to adequately protect the interests involved. 
On appeal, the Supreme Court measured the sufficiency of the 
New York procedures by ostensibly using the test it had recently 
set forth in Matthews v. Eldridge. 84 There the Court sought to 
balance the private interest affected, the risk of erroneous depriva­
tion of such an interest,85 and the probable value of additional 
safeguards against the fiscal and administrative burdens of provid­
ing the additional safeguards. 86 Using this test,87 the Court found 
that the district court's proposal for automatic agency review of 
child placement in every case where removal is sought was un­
necessary. In the Court's view if the foster parents do not care 
enough to request a hearing as provided, the emotional attach­
ments are not significant enough to be worth protecting. 88 The 
83. Id. at 286. 
84. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). In this case an action was brought challenging the 
validity of administrative procedures for the termination of social security disability 
benefits. The Court held that a prior evidentiary hearing was not required and that 
the termination procedures fully complied with due process. 
85. "[T]he possible length of wrongful deprivation ... is an important factor in 
assessing the impact of official action on the private interests." Fusari v. Steinberg, 
419 U.S. 379, 389 (1975). 
86. "While the problem of additional expense must be kept in mind, it does not 
justify denying a hearing meeting the ordinary standards of due process." Goldberg 
v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261 (1970) (quoting Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F. Supp. 893, 901 
(S.D.N.Y. 1968». 
87. 431 U.S. 848-51. 
88. The Supreme Court noted that since the institution of the New York City 
procedure, which provides for a pre-removal agency hearing at the request of the 
foster parents, there had been approximately 5,600 transfers but only 26 foster pa­
rents requested hearings. Id. at 851. 
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Court therefore reasoned that the administrative burden on the 
state to provide for automatic review would be too great. 89 
It is unrealistic to assume that because the foster parent does 
not request a hearing, no significant emotional attachments exist in 
the foster family. This view ignores the possibility that the child 
might substantially benefit from an unrequested hearing. It is cer­
tainly possible that a significant number of foster parents may be 
unaware of their right to a hearing. In addition, it has been estab­
lished that if an interest is worthy of substantial protections, then 
administrative burdens alone are not reason enough to deny due 
process p~otections. 90 
The Supreme Court found that the child and biological parents 
are not necessary parties to the hearing, and further pointed out 
that there is nothing in the procedures that would prevent them 
from taking part in the proceeding if it became apparent that their 
presence would be valuable. 91 This observation is accurate, but it 
is likely that the child's best interests would be better served by 
requiring their participation. This would increase the chances of 
gathering all relevant data necessary to an accurate and construc­
tive determination. 
The Supreme Court also rejected the district court's conten­
tion that the New York City rule92 is inadequate in that it does not 
apply to the removal of a child who is to be returned to his natural 
parents. The Court asserted that different interests must be bal­
anced in this situation, and that the foster parents' rights must be 
severely limited where they compete against the rights of the 
natural parents.93 However, this reasoning fails to recognize the 
benefits that a full hearing would provide regardless of whether or 
not the child is to be returned to his natural parents. 94 
Finally, the Supreme Court attacked the district court's find­
ings as to section 392,95 determining that: 1) The eighteen month 
minimum period before which review is possible is not inadequate 
in that the district court's proposal for a twelve month limit had not 
been established as being a more accurate indication of the time in 
89. Id. 
90. See note 86 supra. 
91. 431 U.S. at 851-52. 
92. See note 80 supra. 
93. 431 U.S. at 853. 
94. See note 33 supra and accompanying text. A fuJI hearing should increase 
the chances of a proper determination. The effect of such a hearing should not be 
detrimental to the interests of the natural parents unless their conduct warrants such 
action in promoting the best interests of the child. 
95. See note 65 supra. 
1978] NOTES 257 
which emotional bonds have formed;96 2) New York judicial in­
terpretation of the statute permits an order requiring the child to 
be left in the same foster home, contrary to the district court's 
assertion;97 3) the procedure need not provide automatic review in 
every case. 98 The Court concluded that since the section 392 rem­
edy was constitutionally sufficient to protect 
whatever liberty interest might exist in the continued existence 
of the foster family when the State seeks to transfer the child to 
another foster home, a fortiori the procedure is adequate to pro­
tect the lesser interest of the foster family in remaining together 
at the expense of the disruption of the natural family. 99 
It is curious that the Court reached its holding without fixing 
the magnitude of the liberty interest in the foster family. The 
amount of protection necessary to comply with due process should 
depend on the nature and strength of that interest. 100 Therefore 
the logical approach would have been to precisely classify the 
interest involved before attempting to determine what process is 
due. The Court's approach is especially difficult to justify in light of 
the majority's express recognition that a liberty interest does exist 
in the foster family. 101 
Although the Court stated that it was applying the Matthews 
test,102 it did not actually follow it. If the Court had applied the 
test strictly, it would have concluded that the nature of the interest 
involved is so important, and the possible harm that could result 
from the use of inadequate procedures to protect that interest so 
great,103 that the administrative burdens of providing for automatic 
hearings should not be permitted to outweigh the benefit to the 
child, the foster family, and society.104 This reluctance on the part 
96. The Supreme Court saw no justification for the district court to substitute 
its view for that of the New York Legislature. Any line drawn is likely to be some­
what arbitrary, giving protection to families where no bonds have formed while fail­
ing to protect relationships in other families that have developed quickly. 431 U.S. at 
854. 
97. [d. See note 78 supra. 
98. See note 89 supra and accompanying text. 
99. 431 U.S. at 855. 
100. "[C]onsideration of what procedures due process may require under any 
given set of circumstances must begin with a determination of the precise nature of 
the government function involved as well as of the private interest that has been af­
fected by government action." Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union Local 473 v. 
McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961). 
101. See note 25 supra and accompanying text. 
102. See notes 84-88 supra and accompanying text. 
103. OFFER v. Dumpson, 418 F. Supp. 277, 284 n.16 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). 
104. Society has an important stake in seeing that children grow up in an envi­
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of the Court to strike down the New York provisions despite rec­
ognition of the existence of a liberty interest may be explained by 
the Court's admitted hesitancy to go too far when dealing "with 
issues of unusual delicacy, in an area where professional judgments 
regarding desirable procedures are constantly and rapidly chang­
ing. "105 This position leaves the lower courts with the responsibil­
ity for determining the sufficiency of the removal procedures in 
their respective states. 
V. SUMMARY 
Under our present foster care system, long-term placements of 
foster children with a single foster family are commonplace. This 
situation has inevitably led to the creation of strong emotional at­
tachments within the foster family. Because of these attachments, 
great psychological harm could come to the child if he is forcibly 
separated from his foster family. It is clear that there must be some 
protection for the child and possibly the foster parents to prevent 
an arbitrary and destqJctive separation. 
To provide protection for the child when his custody or place­
ment is in question, the "best interests of the child" test was de­
veloped by the courts and subsequently adopted by various legis­
latures. This test implicitly recognizes that a child has a right to be 
protected from being forced to grow up in an environment which 
may be dangerous to his welfare. The child must be permitted to 
remain in a stable environment where strong family ties exist, re­
gardless of whether the family is biological, adoptive, or foster in 
nature. In recent years, the courts have recognized and expanded 
the rights of the child to ensure that the best interests of the child 
will be served. In so doing, they have created a liberty interest in 
the child of substantial weight, that demands appropriate constitu­
tional protections. 
Courts have also recognized that a liberty interest exists in the 
foster parents, even though in reality they are usually acting to 
protect the interests of the child. Providing for such an interest in 
the foster parents may be a useful way to ensure that the foster 
child's best interests are being promoted. Regardless of whether 
the liberty interest is viewed as existing in the foster parent, foster 
ronment that will help them to develop into productive adults. Studies have revealed 
~hat placement in foster care has resulted in significant improvement in the chil­
dren's well-being with respect to their physical health, behavior control, ability to 
cope in school, and peer relations. Wald, supra note 2, at 646-47. Continuation in 
an environment which has produced such positive results should eventually have a 
beneficial effect on society at large. 
105. 431 U.S. at 855. 
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child, foster family, or any combination of the three, it is clear that 
the interest increases with the length of time a child spends' in a 
single foster home. The interest may also be stronger in situations 
where the removal precedes a transfer to another foster home as 
opposed to a return to his natural or adoptive parents. Whatever 
the circumstances, this interest should never be regarded as insig­
nificant or unworthy of basic protections. Rather, it should be 
given overriding concern in determining what should be done with 
the child. . 
In upholding the validity of the New York statutes the Su­
preme Court must have realized that such procedures afforded a 
great deal of protection to the foster family in removal situations 
when compared with protections available in other jurisdictions. To 
strike down such a statutory scheme would have forced the Court 
to define the minimum standards necessary to protect the interests 
in the foster family. The Court's reluctance to forward such a defi­
nition leaves the issue open to interpretation by the lower courts. 
It is probable that the near future will bring increased litigation in 
jurisdictions which are not as progressive as New York in this area 
of the law. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
A liberty interest must be recognized in the foster family which 
is of such magnitude as to require that certain procedural safeguards 
be satisfied before a foster child may be removed from the family. 
First, and most importantly, the removal hearing should require the 
presence of all parties who may have information relevant to the dis­
position. In addition, cross-examination of the parties should be pro­
vided for so that all relevant information may become available to the 
fact-finder who must make the ultimate determination. The in­
creased administrative burdens cannot be viewed as too great, in 
light of the nature of the interest involved. The interests of the child 
should be the overriding concern because of the potential harm 
that may be caused by a misinformed determination. It is only 
when all relevant information is gathered and analyzed that the 
child can be adequately protected. Due to the extreme importance 
of the child's interest, these minimum procedures should be re­
quired in all circumstances, except when the state must act sum­
marily in emergency situations. 106 
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106. This exception was recognized by the district court as a necessary means 
of protecting the child where his welfare is immediately threatened. 418 F. Supp. at 
286. 
